1. Whether the First Term of the Union is the Three Persons

103. It cannot be the case that the first term of this union is the three persons, because it does not seem that one nature could be assumed by three persons at the same time; for, in every essential dependence, one dependent thing precisely depends on only one thing that totally terminates its dependence; in this union the dependence is essential and belongs to one nature, and one person totally terminates it; therefore the same nature cannot depend in this way on several such persons.

104. The proof of the major, in the case of every dependence of a caused thing on the cause, is that it is impossible for the same caused thing to have, in the same genus of cause, several total causes on which it depends; for the result would be that then it would still exist when the cause on which it essentially depended did not exist. For if it has a as total efficient cause and likewise b along with it as total efficient cause, then it would be sufficiently caused by a when everything else was removed - otherwise a would not be its total cause; therefore the effect would come from a when b did not exist, and so it would not depend on b. Similarly contrariwise about a, if b is posited as total cause. Therefore if a is its total cause and b likewise, each and neither will be total cause. Thus does it seem to be in the case of all dependences, even those that are not of caused things on causes, for, since the dependence of anything will be totally terminated by a given thing, it cannot depend - with a dependence of the same nature - on something else [1 d.2 n.73].This argument, which Scotus presents more than once, seems unconvincing, for ‘total’ may be understood in two ways, as sufficient cause of an effect or as the cause without which the effect would not be. So let a and b each be sufficient for a certain effect and let both be present and active at once; then, if by total cause is meant sufficient cause, each is total cause even separately because each would cause the effect even in the absence of the other; if, on the other hand, by total cause is meant the cause without which the effect would not be, then only a and b together are total cause, because only when both are removed does the effect cease to be. But that a and b are only together total cause in the second sense does not mean that they cannot separately be total cause in the first sense. Scotus’ argument works only against total cause in the second sense, while his conclusion requires it to work against total cause in the first sense. ⁴ Confirmation comes from the case of accidents in relation to several first subjects.

105. The proof of the minor is that a created personhood would totally terminate the created nature, and - while that created personhood remained - the nature could not exist at the same time in another person (created or uncreated); because any personhood of a divine person would terminate the nature, and its dependence, no less than the nature would be terminated within itself [sc. by its created personhood];     therefore etc     .

106. An objection against this is that it does not seem unacceptable for several relations of the same idea to exist in the same subject, as when the same white thing is similar to several white things; therefore likewise in the issue at hand it will not be unacceptable for the same absolute thing to depend on several persons by several dependences of the same idea. But if the dependences are posited to be of a different idea, the conclusion will be got the more.

107. I reply that, just as not every relation, whereby it is a relation, is the same as the foundation (even if some relation is such, namely one that is first in foundation to the term and the foundation cannot in any way exist without this term, as was said in 2 d.1 nn.260-263, 266-267), so neither is there repugnance to relation whereby it is relation that several relations of the same idea should exist in the same thing; but there is a repugnance in the case of certain special relations, namely essential dependences; for these are such that, if one of them is dependent on a totally terminating term, the foundation does not leave it dependent with a like dependence on anything else, because then it would not be a terminated dependence.